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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
When Rules Are Made to Be Broken:
The Case of  Sexual 
Harassment Law
CORNELL CENTER FOR HOSPITALITY RESEARCH
CORNELL INSTITUTE FOR HOSPITALITY LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
by David Sherwyn, Nicholas F. Menillo, and Zev J. Eigen
Judicial holdings regarding sexual harassment actions have put judges who want to ensure what they view as a just outcome in the awkward position of  having to choose between following precedent or “breaking the rules.” This article presents a theoretical assessment and empirical analysis of  judicial rule-breaking with regard to two rules relating to sexual harassment. The 
first such rule, established in the Oncale decision, opened the door to the “equal-opportunity harasser” who 
treats everyone badly and thus escapes the prohibition on harassment “due to sex.” The other rule, set forth 
in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, establishes a two-prong requirement for companies to demonstrate that 
they should not be held liable in the case of  sexual harassment of  an employee. The requirements for the so-
called affirmative defense are, first, that the employer acted reasonably in relation to a complaint, and second 
that the employee acted unreasonably, usually indicated by a tardy complaint. Our analysis of  131 cases finds 
that the likelihood of  rule-breaking increases when judges perceive that an employer that is otherwise 
meritorious (that is, responds effectively to the complaint) could be held liable (in the case of  Ellerth and 
Faragher). On the other hand, courts have followed the rule when an unjust outcome has small repercussions 
(as in Oncale). Of  interest in this context is how the courts will treat a new sexual harassment rule, as outlined 
in the Supreme Court’s Vance decision. 
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The Case of  Sexual Harassment Law
This article is concerned with addressing the choice that judges face when they are presented with a judicially created rule that would lead to injustice if  followed. Such is the case with current holdings in cases relating to sexual harassment. We are particularly interested in the circumstances that encourage judges to follow one particular rule to the letter while 
bending (or ignoring) another rule. This is the situation with two rules relating to sexual harassment, one 
established in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services and the other in Faragher v. City of  Boca Raton and Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.1 Because no lives hang in the balance and no matters of  national security are being 
weighed in these cases, we can see what judges do with problematic rules in the absence of  political and social 
pressure. 
1 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 80–82 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749–66 (1998); and Faragher v. City of  Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–92 (1998).
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Discrimination claims make up close to 40 percent of  the 
federal court docket, and sexual harassment claims make up 
close to 10 percent of  all discrimination charges.2 In deciding 
which path to take in these cases, judges are likely to start from 
a position of  preferring the path of  applying the rule correctly. 
The complication to this principle occurs when judges perceive 
that an unjust outcome is likely. We submit that judges will apply 
the rule with the unjust outcome under two conditions: first, 
that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress will adjust the 
rule any time soon, and, second, that the injustice produced by 
applying the rule perfectly will not be too severe. We believe that 
the cases we analyze here fit both of  those criteria.
The sexual harassment decisions that we examine consti-
tute a body of  cases that provides reasonable control of  extrane-
ous factors and permits isolated observation of  the judicial 
decision-making process. Our analysis examines why courts 
tend to follow the Oncale test but not the Ellerth/Faragher test. 
This issue is of  particular interest because we also now have 
a third untenable rule, enunciated recently in Vance v. Ball State, 
which effectively redefines who is a supervisor with regard to 
sexual harassment. 3 This case has no progeny as yet, so we can-
not yet test the Vance rule, but our analysis of  the older cases can 
be used to forecast the courts’ likely approach to the Vance test.
Applying its standard for liability for harassment by a su-
pervisor, the Court in Vance held that an employer may be vicari-
ously liable for a supervisor’s unlawful harassment only when 
the “employer has empowered that [supervisor] to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a ‘signifi-
cant change in employment status,’ such as hiring, firing, failing 
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsi-
bilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”4 
One complication relating to this rule is that to comply with an 
ever-burgeoning array of  employment laws, companies were 
already well advised to make their human resources department 
the only real decision maker in the firm.5 Time will tell how the 
Vance rule will interact with that reality.
One clue to how courts will apply the Vance rule may be the 
way the courts have applied two similarly untenable rules, in this 
case, those created in Oncale and in Ellerth/Faragher. The Oncale 
rule is, an employer may escape agency-based liability for the 
actions of  a manager who sexually harassed an employee of  one 
gender if  the harasser also sexually harassed an employee of  the 
other gender, a rule known as the “equal-opportunity harass-
2 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimina-
tion Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Emp. L. Stud. 429 (2004).
3 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
4 Id. at 2443.
5 Kelli F. Robinson, Comment, Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible 
Employment Action: The Impact of  Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 36 Cumb. 
L. Rev. 581, 600 (2006).
ment defense.” 6 The Ellerth and Faragher rule is that an employer 
(who has otherwise acted reasonably) may avoid liability if  the 
employee-plaintiff behaves unreasonably, which often equates 
to failing to complain or report the alleged sexual harassment 
either in a timely fashion or at all.7 One logical extension of  
this holding was that employers, no matter how much care they 
exercised to prevent harassment and no matter how well they 
responded to harassment complaints, would be liable if  the 
employee complained in a timely manner. As we explain below, 
this is an outcome that courts have sought to avoid.
The analysis we present in this article finds that almost 
all judges dutifully applied the Oncale rule, but most have not 
followed the reasonable-employee prong of  the rule stem-
ming from Ellerth and Faragher. On their face, both are simple 
rules that are easy to apply and they carry identical penalties. 
Moreover, both lead to unjust results. The equal opportunity 
harassment rule allows harassment so long as both male and 
female victims are harmed, while the reasonable-employee rule 
ties employers’ liability to whether the employee had the where-
withal to make a proper report. We see that liability in either 
situation has little to do with the employer’s actions. Moreover, 
both rules as applied create perverse incentives, one by promot-
ing universal harassment and the other by encouraging employ-
ers to design reporting policies and practices that discourage 
prompt reporting of  harassment.
While it’s possible that pro-employer bias may be a factor 
explaining courts’ adherence to Oncale and departure from El-
lerth/Faragher, pro-employer bias does not explain the particular 
way in which courts have modified Ellerth/Faragher. Instead we 
see three issues: (1) the frequency of  Oncale cases compared 
with the number of  Ellerth/Faragher actions; (2) the likelihood 
of  perverse incentives being actualized by society resulting 
from holdings properly applying the rules; and (3) the effect on 
judges’ perceived values of  issuing abhorrent rulings. 
After a brief  review of  sexual harassment law, we present 
these two untenable rules in more detail. We then analyze the 
discrepant outcome of  the two rules, and we conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of  these findings, particularly in regard 
to the rule promulgated in Vance.
The Origins and Early History of   
Sexual Harassment Law
As a starting point, we note that there is no federal statute that 
prohibits or even addresses sexual harassment in the work-
6 Oncale supra; see also: Miguel Nieves, Joseph Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.: Redefining Workplace Sexual Harassment to Include Same-Sex Sexual Ha-
rassment and the Effect on Employers, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 941 (2000) (discussing 
the use of  this term and defense); and Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with 
Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691, 719–20 (1997).
7 Faragher, supra; and Ellerth, supra.
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place.8 In 1980, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) expanded its guidelines on discrimination 
because of  sex under Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964 
to include sexual harassment.9 After the EEOC published those 
guidelines, courts routinely held that sexual harassment due to 
a hostile environment did in fact create a cause of  action.10 In 
1986, the U.S. Supreme Court put to rest any lingering ques-
tions concerning the legal efficacy of  the hostile-environment 
theory in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.11 
In its relatively brief  opinion, the Meritor Court: (1) estab-
lished sexual harassment as a violation of  Title VII; (2) held 
that there are two types of  harassment: quid pro quo (this for that) 
and hostile environment; (3) held that the conduct had to be 
“because of  sex”; and (4) provided a basis for employer liability, 
instructing courts to look to agency principles.12 In the 1998 On-
cale, Ellerth, and Faragher opinions, the Court was forced to revisit 
the terms “because of  sex,” “quid pro quo,” “hostile environment,” 
and “associated agency principles.”13 The resulting holdings cre-
ated the untenable rules that are the subject of  this article.
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment  
and the “Because of  Sex” Problem
At its inception, sexual harassment focused exclusively on male 
supervisors harassing subordinate women, as occurred in the 
8 For example, see: Gillian Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based 
Harassment, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1166 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of  Congressional intent embodied in Title VII’s protection 
against sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
64 (1986)); and Michelle Angelone, Same-Sex Harassment Claims Under Title VII: 
Quick v. Donaldson Co. Breathes New Life into the Post-Garcia State of  the Law, 9 J. 
Law. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 76–79 (1997) (discussing several courts’ interpretations 
of  Congressional intent underlying sexual discrimination). “Tangible losses” 
occur when there is a material change in employment, such as termination, 
failure to promote, demotion, or a change in benefits. See: Ellerth, at 761.
9 The EEOC Guidelines define quid pro quo harassment as “Unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of  a sexual nature … when (1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of  an individual’s employment, 
[or] (2) submission to or rejection of  such conduct by an individual is used 
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a) (1985).
10 See: Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982) (“Sexual harassment 
which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of  one sex is 
every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman 
run a gauntlet of  sexual abuse in return for the privilege of  being allowed to 
work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harsh-
est of  racial epithets.”); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–55 (CA4 1983); Bundy v. 
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934–44 (D.C. App. 1981); and Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 
589 F.Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
11 Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, supra.
12 Id. at 72.
13 Ellerth, supra; Faragher, supra; and Oncale, supra. See: Vicki Schultz, The 
Sanitized Workplace, 112 Yale L.J. 2061 (2003); Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career 
of  Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 307 (1998); and 
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683 (1998).
Meritor case.14 Eventually, though, courts were confronted with 
male plaintiffs alleging hostile environment harassment by 
female supervisors, and upheld that cause of  action. 15 When 
circuit courts were faced with an onslaught of  “same-sex” sexual 
harassment cases, between 1992 and 1997, they produced four 
different legal standards, prompting the Supreme Court to ad-
dress the issue in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.16 
Let’s briefly look at the four diverse cases that led to the 
Oncale ruling. The Fourth Circuit, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of  
America, Inc., held in 1996 that a same-sex sexual harassment 
claim would lie under Title VII if  the harasser was gay. Just 
before that, in 1995, the Eighth Circuit, in Quick v. Donaldson Co., 
Inc., held that plaintiffs could maintain a claim for same-sex sex-
ual harassment so long as employees of  only one gender suffered 
the alleged conduct. 17 Note in this holding that if  both men and 
women were treated similarly, even if  poorly, then there was no 
cause of  action.18 Then, in 1997, the Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. 
City of  Belleville, held that an employee could maintain a claim of  
same-sex sexual harassment if  the employee was treated poorly 
for failing to live up to a sexual stereotype.19 Finally, the clearest, 
but probably most troublesome holding had already occurred in 
1994, in the case of  Garcia v. Elf  Atochem North America, where the 
Fifth Circuit Court flatly stated: “[H]arassment by a male su-
pervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under 
Title VII even though the harassment has sexual overtones.”20
The Supreme Court took the opportunity to resolve this 
split among the circuits when it reviewed the Oncale case, which 
had also been heard by the Fifth Circuit. That court had 
dismissed petitioner Oncale’s action because it was bound by its 
decision in Garcia. 21 However, in its Oncale decision, the Court 
created one of  the bad rules we are examining. 
The second bad rule arose as a result of  the problem of  
determining when an employer should be held vicariously liable 
14 MacKinnon, supra; and Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of  
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 12 Lab. Law. 291, 292 (1996).
15 See, for example: Egli v. Stevens, No. Civ.A. 93-157, 1993 WL 153141, 
at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993), aff’d, 17 F.3d. 1429 (3d Cir.1994); and Show-
alter v. Allison Reed Grp., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991); cf. Carter v. 
Caring for Homeless of  Peekskill, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (acknowl-
edging that the same cause of  action is available for male as for female victims 
of  harassment by applying the same standard, but ultimately finding that the 
evidence was insufficient to support male employee’s claim of  hostile environ-
ment). Compare to: Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, n.15 (3d Cir. 
1990) (explaining in dicta that while quid pro quo claims were available to male 
plaintiffs against their female supervisors, it would require a higher standard 
of  proof  to sustain a male plaintiff’s claim of  hostile environment sexual 
harassment against a female supervisor)
16 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
17 Wrightson, 99 F.3d 138; and Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378–79.
18 Id. Compare to Oncale.
19 Doe v. City of  Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997).
20 Garcia v. Elf  Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (1994).
21 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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for sexual harassment committed by an employee. This issue 
arose directly out of  the Meritor Court’s failure to clearly define 
quid pro quo, hostile environment, and agency principles.22 As the 
lower courts sought to define each of  these terms, they regularly 
commingled the concepts in determining employer liability for 
sexual harassment, as we explain next. 
Determining Employer Liability:  
What Preceded Ellerth and Faragher
After Meritor, lower courts were required to look to agency 
principles to determine employer liability for employees’ bad 
conduct.23 By 1998, the circuits had agreed that employers were 
always liable for quid pro quo harassment, while liability for hos-
tile environment harassment fell under either of  two theories. 24 
The minority of  courts held that if  a supervisor acted within the 
“scope of  employment” to create a hostile environment, then the 
company would be held liable.25 Conversely, the majority of  cir-
cuits held that the employer was liable if  it knew or should have 
known about the alleged harassment (the so-called “negligence 
standard”).26 That the labels were both unclear and overlapping 
likely contributed to the substantial increase in sexual harass-
ment litigation throughout the 1990s.27 The complaints involved 
diverse scenarios, including, for example: (1) an employee who 
refused to sleep with the supervisor and was not fired; (2) an 
employee who did sleep with the supervisor and was not fired; 
(3) an employee who quit, with the supervisor later claiming 
the purported threat was a joke; and (4) an unclear threat, such 
as, “things would go better for you here if  you wore more pro-
vocative clothes and were a little more accommodating,” after 
which the employee quit, acquiesced, or ignored the supervisor 
(depending on the case), but was not disciplined. There are 
cases in which each of  these scenarios has been labeled quid 
22 For example, see: Katherine Philippakis, Comment, When Employers 
Should Be Liable for Supervisory Personnel: Applying Agency Principles to Hostile-
Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 1275 (1996) (illustrating 
the ambiguity brought on by the Court’s failure to precisely define “agency 
principles” by pointing out the confusion among lower courts).
23 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
24 For examples of  findings that employers are vicariously liable for quid 
pro quo harassment, see: Davis v. City of  Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 513–14; Bouton v. BMW of  N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 
103, 106–07 (3d Cir. 1994) ; Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d 
Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kauffman 
v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185–86 (6th Cir. 1992); and Steele v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989). See also: Bouton v. BMW 
of  N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106–07 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring use of  actual au-
thority to hold employer vicariously liable for hostile work environment); and 
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of  Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493–94 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring 
negligence to hold employer vicariously liable for hostile work environment).
25 For example, see: Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 183. 
26 For example, see: Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493–94; and Philippakis, supra, at 
1282-1283.
27 Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of  Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 548, 551 & n.7 (2001). 
pro quo harassment, hostile environment harassment, both, and 
neither.28 We suggest that the diverse opinions in these cases are 
the product of  results-oriented adjudication that led to the split 
in the circuits that the Supreme Court addressed in Ellerth and 
Faragher.
The Two Bad Rules
Rule One: “Because of Sex”
In Oncale, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a plaintiff could 
make out a claim for sexual harassment as long as the harass-
ing conduct was “because of  sex.”29 “Because of  sex,” however, 
does not mean that the conduct is sexual in nature, given that 
the Court further held that making conduct of  a sexual nature 
per se unlawful would create a general civility code for the 
American workplace and would ignore the differences in the 
ways men and women routinely interact with members of  the 
same and opposite sex. The Court said:
The prohibition of  harassment on the basis of  sex 
requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the 
workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively 
offensive as to alter the “conditions” of  the victim’s 
employment. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive 
work environment—an environment that a reason-
able person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond 
Title VII’s purview.30
Removing the requirement that the conduct be sexual in 
nature created an unjust result by opening a new door, which 
was subsequently used by the so-called equal opportunity 
harasser. The Court stated that a man could prove same-sex 
harassment if  men were subjected to some form of  harassing 
conduct and women were not.31 However, the obvious logical 
extension of  this argument is that if  women were subjected to 
the same conduct as men then there is no actionable harassment 
for either the men or the women. As we explain in the next sec-
tion, the courts followed this rule, despite its undesirable results.
28 For examples of  conflicting findings, see: Holly D. v. California Inst. of  
Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) (classifying an implied threat as a 
hostile work environment); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(suggesting that an implied demand for sex could be considered hostile work 
environment); Estes v. Illinois Dept. of  Human Services, 05 C 5750, 2007 WL 
551554 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2007) (defining hostile work environment cases as 
ones in which no tangible action was taken); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of  Am., 123 
F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that cases in which an employer “fires 
her, or denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled raise, or demotes her, or 
transfers her to a less desirable job location, or refuses to give her the training 
that the company’s rules entitle her to receive” are quid pro quo and not hostile 
work environment); and Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Services, Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 904 
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that a supervisor’s direct request for sex qualified as a 
hostile work environment).
29 Oncale, supra.
30 Id. at 81.
31 Id. at 80–81.
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The Equal-Opportunity Harasser Defense
In Holman v. Indiana, a husband and wife, both employed by the 
Indiana Department of  Transportation, alleged that the same 
male supervisor sexually harassed each of  them.32 The wife 
alleged that when she refused the supervisor’s overtures, he 
negatively altered her job-performance evaluations and other-
wise retaliated against her for protesting his harassing behavior. 
The supervisor also grabbed the husband, who also refused his 
requests, and the supervisor retaliated by opening the husband’s 
locker and throwing away his belongings.
The District Court for the Northern District of  Indiana dis-
missed the case based on the equal-opportunity harasser defense, 
on the grounds that the harasser had treated the plaintiffs equally 
badly.33 The court concluded: “Simply put, …under current Title 
VII jurisprudence, conduct occurring equally to members of  
both genders cannot be discrimination “because of  sex’” and is 
therefore not unlawful.34
Similarly, in Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., the District 
Court in Puerto Rico dismissed the plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
case because the supervisor, Figueroa, exhibited the same harass-
ing conduct to both men and women.35 The court stated: “While 
Figueroa’s behavior and comments were often sexual in nature, 
and may have created an undignified or even unpleasant working 
environment, they were not discriminatory [between men and 
women] and thus not actionable under Title VII.”36 Further, the 
Romero court stated that the equal-opportunity harasser defense 
defeats both quid pro quo and hostile environment cases.37
If  two principal functions of  judicial decisions are to allocate 
justice to the parties and to impose rules that incentivize good be-
havior, the equal-opportunity harasser defense undermines both 
of  those goals. 38 The Holmans, for example, suffered tremendous 
injustice, and together with Romero experienced the same type 
of  conduct as any sexual harassment claimant. Yet they all were 
denied redress under Title VII solely because they were harassed 
by someone who harassed members of  both genders—a fact that 
in no way reduces the degree of  harm they suffered. The courts 
in Holman and Romero accurately applied Oncale, but doing so 
deprived the plaintiffs of  justice. 
32 Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 916.
35 Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Rests., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.P.R. 
1998).
36 Id. at 190.
37 Id.
38 See: Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Inventive Aspects of  Judicial Decisions, 
79 Geo. L.J. 1447 (1991) (discussing the incentive and status effects of  judicial 
opinions). Also see: Barry Friedman, The Politics of  Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. 
Rev. 257 (2005) (providing an overview of  various positive and normative schol-
arship concerning motivations of  judicial decisionmaking).
Moreover, this rule creates incentives that are downright 
bizarre. Managers learn that they have carte blanche to sexually 
harass employees so long as they conduct themselves the same 
way with both sexes. Despite these abhorrent results, courts 
follow this rule even when they would be justified in ignoring it. 
In Oncale, the defense was neither raised nor discussed.39 Judges 
could, therefore, cite that distinction as a basis for refusing 
to validate the defense. But judges do not do this and instead 
uniformly follow this rule. Next, we examine the converse situ-
ation, when courts generally ignore a clear rule. 
The Second Bad Rule
Ellerth and Faragher: The Two-Prong Test
In Burlington Industries., Inc. v. Ellerth, which was decided on the 
same day as Faragher v. City of  Boca Raton, the Supreme Court 
reconsidered the definition of  quid pro quo sexual harassment, 
effectively concluding that the “this for that” threat must be 
carried out for a complainant to demonstrate this type of  
harassment.40 That is, the Court held that the key issue was 
whether the employee suffered a tangible loss.41 If  so, the 
employer would be strictly liable. However, the Court opened 
another door under which the employer could still be liable in 
a hostile environment case, but could also escape liability using 
an affirmative defense with two prongs, as we explain next. 
The Affirmative Defense
As explained in the decision by Justice David Souter, the 
affirmative Ellerth/Faragher defense has two prongs: (1) “that 
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior” (the “reasonable 
employer” prong), and (2) “that the plaintiff employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of  any preventive or correc-
tive opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise” (the “unreasonable employee” prong).42 Upon any 
fair reading of  this language, employers cannot avoid liability 
simply by proving that they acted reasonably or even with 
39 523 U.S. 75.
40 Ellerth, supra; Faragher, supra. We say arguably because the contrast 
that the Court used is a false dichotomy: “as opposed to bothersome atten-
tions or sexual remarks that are severe or pervasive.” The former has never 
been considered unlawful harassment and the latter is about as clear a 
definition of  hostile environment as we have. The true dichotomy would be: 
Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro 
quo cases, as opposed to cases where an employee is not disciplined after ei-
ther: (1) acquiescing to, or (2) rejecting a supervisor’s advances. Despite the 
Court’s lack of  clarity, one could argue that Ellerth stands for the proposition 
that in order for there to be quid pro quo harassment the employee must suffer 
the discipline threatened. If  this is the case, then all cases with no discipline 
would be hostile environment cases.
41 Ellerth, at 764–65.
42 Id.
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the utmost care.43 They must also prove that the employee was 
unreasonable in some way. 
That reading does not square with the actuality, though, as 
courts have routinely permitted well-behaved employers to avoid 
liability even when employees also behaved entirely reasonably 
by any measure.44 To investigate this issue, the study we present 
in this article examines plaintiffs’ appeals of  131 summary judg-
ment motions in which the defendant employer prevailed. 
Methodology, Descriptive Statistics, and Inferential 
Model
This study aimed to evaluate as closely as possible all federal ap-
pellate court opinions evaluating the merits of  the Ellerth/Faragh-
er defense in connection with summary judgments. We searched 
on Thomson Reuters Westlaw45 in the “Federal Courts of  
Appeal[s]” database using search terms that we believe captured 
every case that cites or mentions Ellerth or Faragher and uses the 
terms “summary judgment” and “sexual harassment” (or varia-
tions on these phrases). Intended to be overbroad, the search 
returned 644 results. After we discarded irrelevant cases, 131 
cases remained.46 
Coding method. A primary question of  interest in this 
study is how five independent variables affect the success of  the 
two prongs of  the Ellerth/Faragher defense and the overall af-
firmative defense. Two variables represent whether the employer 
satisfied the reasonable employer and unreasonable employee 
prongs, a third confirms whether the employer satisfied both 
prongs, and the others account for the employer’s and employ-
ee’s characteristics. Overall, our study looked at five aspects of  
each case: (1) employer behavior, (2) employee behavior,  
(3) employer characteristics, (4) employee characteristics, and 
(5) other case characteristics.  
Employer Behavior
Employer behavior concerns employers’ efforts to prevent 
and correct harassment insofar as they are relevant to the 
reasonable-employer prong of  the affirmative defense. First, 
we assessed whether an employer had a good anti-harassment 
policy in place. A good policy in this instance is one that has 
been disseminated to employees and provides channels other 
43 This was the concern highlighted in the dissent by Justice Clarence 
Thomas. Id. at 773.
44 See: Id. at 1266.
45 Formerly known as WestlawNext.
46 For example, we eliminated cases that did not involve Title VII, did 
not involve supervisor harassment, presented insufficient facts to evaluate the 
new standard, or merely cited Ellerth/Faragher for procedural or other reasons 
not involving harassment. For an earlier iteration of  this study, see: David 
Sherwyn, Michael Heise, and Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of  the 
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 Ford. L. Rev. 1265, 
1292 (2001).
than the supervisor to report. 47 Of  the 131 cases, 110 employ-
ers had a policy (84%), and 69 (63%) of  those were considered 
good policies by the court. Second, we determined whether an 
employer took preventive efforts beyond maintaining a good 
policy (e.g., establishing a toll-free hotline or conducting harass-
ment training). Forty-nine (37.4%) employers were described as 
having taken other such efforts. Only one of  the employers that 
did not have a harassment policy in place took “other efforts,” 
as tracked by this variable.48 
Two elements related to the correction portion of  the 
reasonable employer prong. The first is whether an employer 
responded to a harassment allegation in a way the court charac-
terizes as good. Courts are surprisingly deferential in this inquiry, 
and accepted employer responses in about three-quarters of  the 
cases. Acceptable responses included promptly firing a harasser, 
transferring an alleged harasser or even an alleged victim to a 
different department, or, in a few cases, simply performing an 
investigation that did not culminate in discipline. 49 The second 
correction issue was whether an employer’s general behavior 
(other than its response to the specific complaint) suffered some 
defect, such as failing to enforce its sexual harassment policy 
when there was a complaint or failing to make a good-faith 
investigation.50
Employee Behavior
The other prong of  the affirmative defense rests on employee 
behavior, that is, whether the employee reported the harassment, 
whether that complaint was timely, and whether the report was 
made in good order. In 113 of  the 131 cases (86%), the em-
ployee-plaintiff reported the alleged harassment, and the report 
was deemed timely in 77 of  those cases. Where available we 
47 This definition embraced a variety of  dissemination approaches, such 
as including the policy in the employee handbook, requiring employees to sign 
an attestation that they received and understood the policy, and posting the 
policy in a break room or other employee area. These differences were not 
sufficient to affect our analysis. 
48 Mosby-Grant v. City of  Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(harassment training).
49 Valentine v. City of  Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that transferring the harasser was an appropriate response); Harmon v. Home 
Depot USA Inc., 130 F. App’x 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that transfer-
ring the employee would have been an appropriate response); Baldwin v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of  Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007) (suggest-
ing that offering to transfer the employee was an acceptable response). Also 
see, for example: McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 767–68 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that the employer’s investigation, which resulted in the 
harasser’s termination, shielded it from liability). In nine cases, we could not 
determine with certainty whether the employer responded at all, leaving 122 
for this part of  the analysis.
50 For example, see: Mosby-Grant, 630 F.3d at 337 (employer had a “his-
tory of  sexual harassment”); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 
(2d Cir. 2010) (several of  the avenues for reporting harassment “appeared to 
be ineffective or even threatening”); and Donaldson v. CDB, Inc., 335 F. App’x 
494, 505 (5th Cir. 2009) (prior complaints concerning non-harassment issues 
had proven ineffective). 
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44/45–Retail Trade 11%
48/49–Transportation and Warehousing 5%
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EEOC Was a Party 4%
Multi-Plaintiff Lawsuit 8%
collected the length of  the delay in months. Although the length 
of  delay was not part of  the model of  the defense prongs, it 
turns out that the length of  any delay is a point of  interest with 
regard to the courts’ disregard of  this prong.51 Nine of  the cases 
involved reporting defects, such as assertions being too vague52 
or the employee requesting that the employer not pursue action 
against the harasser.53 
We also separately examined whether the employee failed 
to cooperate with the employer’s corrective efforts. In seven 
51 This was, however, included in the model of  Timely because of  its 
theoretical importance to whether a delay is reasonable, as discussed in the 
results of  the study.
52 For example, see: Episcopo v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F. App’x 519, 523 
(7th Cir. 2005);.
53 For example, see: Hardage v. CBS Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188 
(9th Cir. 2005); and Benefield v. Fulton Co., GA, 130 F. App’x 308, 312 (11th Cir. 
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971 
(11th Cir. 2008).
cases, the employer offered to move the employee to a new 
department without any reduction in pay, but the employee 
refused or resigned.54 
Employer Characteristics 
The employer characteristics involved whether the employer 
was private (divided into one of  twenty categories by the NAICS 
classification) or a branch of  government. We were able to iden-
tify 128 out of  133 employers in this way. As shown in Exhibit 1, 
the great majority of  defendants represented a broad spectrum 
of  private sector businesses (with the largest representation in 
manufacturing and retail), with a small cluster of  state or local 
government employers. 
54 For example, see: Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc., 174 F. App’x 18, 27 (3d 
Cir. 2006)
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Employee Characteristics
We started with eight characteristics to classify employees, but 
we soon dropped plaintiffs’ gender, race, and sexual orientation 
because of  widespread unavailability. We did code the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) number, 55 using two digits 
to make broad categories, and the O*NET Job Zone number, 
which categorizes occupations by education, training, and expe-
rience needed.56 We had the SOC for 95 of  the cases and the 
O*NET number for 91 cases.57
55 Standard Occupational Classification, Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  
http://www.bls.gov/SOC/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). Like NAICS, SOC 
is a federal standard classification system developed by the Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics. 
56 Alissa Emmel and Theresa Cosca, The 2010 SOC: A Classification 
System Gets An Update 15 (2010), available at www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2010/
summer/art02.pdf. See also: www.onetcenter.org/about.html.
57 Determining the occupational classification was often challeng-
ing. Appellate courts have little use for specifics about employers’ business 
models or employees’ job duties, except insofar as they inform whether the 
harasser was a supervisor or coworker. Often the only information provided 
is the name of  the business and the employee’s job title. Where possible, we 
supplemented the information with research conducted on the internet.We 
urge caution is urged in interpreting the findings with respect to NAICS, SOC, 
and Job Zone numbers.
As shown in Exhibit 1, plaintiffs were overwhelmingly 
female (95%), and two-thirds worked in O*NET job zones 
two and three, comprising jobs that require either high school 
or vocational training and a reasonable amount of  experience. 
According to O*NET, zone two jobs include orderlies, customer 
service representatives, security guards, and tellers, while typical 
zone three jobs are food-service managers, electricians, barbers, 
nannies, and medical assistants. 
We calculated 79 employees’ tenure at the company in 
months (from start date to the time of  the complaint if  the em-
ployee was still employed when the lawsuit was filed). The mean 
was 53.8 months (but the standard deviation was considerable, 
at 59.3 months), with a minimum of  two months and maximum 
of  264. Only about one-quarter of  employees had been at their 
company for less than one year before filing the discrimination 
lawsuit. We found that the EEOC was a party in five lawsuits, 
and ten cases involved a group or class of  plaintiffs.
Other Case Characteristics
Finally, we compiled information regarding which court of  ap-
peals decided the case and whether the opinion was published. 




Workplace & Work Events 4%
Workplace & Social Events 7%
All Three 6%
Duration
One or More Isolated Incidents 12%
<1 month 1%
1–6 months 42%
6 months–1 year 21%
1–5 years 31%
>5 years 5%
Length of Reporting Delay
<1 month 1%
1–6 months 48%




Nature of alleged harassing conduct
Conduct Alleged
Derogatory Names Generally 11%
Insults Directed to Plaintiff 17%
Comments About Appearance 38%
Sexually Charged Comments, Generally 73%
Sexual Gestures 16%
Written Sexual Comments 3%
Love Letters to Plaintiff 3%
Sexual Contact 54%
Nonsexual Contact 37%
Requests for Dates 19%
Requests for Sexual Favors 37%
Displaying Pornographic Materials 7%
Sexual Assault 9%
Nonsexual, Gender-Related Behavior 8%
Variable Percentage
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nature of  the harassment, including the specific behavior, the 
duration of  the harassment, whether the harassment took the 
form of  a pattern of  behavior or involved isolated instances, 
whether the plaintiff was harassed by only supervisors or both 
supervisors and coworkers, where the harassment took place, 
and the nature of  the alleged harassing behavior. 
As shown in Exhibit 2, sexually charged comments and 
sexual contact were the most frequently alleged behaviors, 
though these are also two of  the less-specific categories. 
Comments about the plaintiff’s appearance, nonsexual contact, 
and requests for sexual favors were also common. Less common 
were things like love letters, written comments to the plaintiff, 
displaying pornographic materials, and outright sexual assault. 
We found that 84 percent of  cases involved workplace-only 
harassment, and in no case was the harassment relegated 
to non-work-related areas, though courts frequently explain 
that harassment need not occur within the workplace to be 
actionable.58
About half  of  the cases involved harassment that lasted up 
to six months, and roughly half  of  the cases involved harass-
ment that lasted between six months and five years, with a few 
cases of  harassment lasting longer than that.
With regard to timeliness, some opinions expressly speci-
fied how long the plaintiff delayed before complaining. Other 
opinions did not specify the delay, but otherwise indicated how 
long the harassment lasted; we used the length of  the harass-
ment in these cases unless there was some indication that the 
plaintiff complained earlier. The trend in the length of  time it 
took the plaintiff to report the harassment is similar to that of  
the length of  the harassment. This confirms the intuition that 
harassment, in the vast majority of  cases, does not last long after 
an employee reports it to the employer. It also lends some sup-
port to the proposition that employers’ corrective efforts were 
generally efficacious.
Effectiveness of  the Affirmative Defense
Overall, the employer was able to establish the affirmative 
defense in 70 percent of  cases. Out of  the 131 cases, the court 
addressed the merits of  both prongs in 119 cases (91%). In 
eight additional cases the court addressed only the reasonable 
employer prong, and in the four remaining cases the court ad-
dressed only the unreasonable employee prong.  
In the 127 cases where the court addressed the merits 
of  the reasonable employer prong, 78 percent of  employers 
were found to have satisfied that test. When courts tested for 
unreasonable employees, employers prevailed on that prong in 
75 percent of  cases where that part of  the defense was consid-
ered. When employers lost for a second time on appeal, which 
58 Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2001). See also: 
Douglas R. Garmager, Discrimination Outside of  the Office: Where to Draw the Walls 
of  the Workplace for A “Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 85 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1075, 1076 (2010).
occurred in about half  of  the cases, the courts determined that 
they had satisfied neither prong. Failure to satisfy the reason-
able employer standard alone occurred in 21 percent of  losses 
on appeal, and the unreasonable employee prong by itself  was 
involved in 31 percent of  unsuccessful appeals.
We found that if  the court addressed both prongs and the 
defendant satisfied only one of  them, it was always the reason-
able employer prong. Exhibit 3 reviews employer preventive be-
havior in that light. As noted above, 84 percent of  the employers 
involved in this study had a policy, but only 73 percent of  cases 
indicated that the policy was adequately disseminated, and only 
54 percent of  cases indicated that the policy contained alterna-
tive channels to report harassment. In short, only 53 percent of  
cases provided enough detail to conclude that the employer’s 
policy was a “good” policy. 59 Employers provided workplace 
harassment training in 31 percent of  cases and had a toll-free 
harassment hotline in 19 percent of  cases. That is, 37 percent of  
employers made “other efforts.”
59 Our measures likely under-report the number of  employers with 
good policies, and the effect of  having a good policy on the success of  the 
defense is likely underestimated because appellate opinions frequently lack the 
level of  detail needed for content-rich coding. For instance, to be coded as hav-
ing a “good policy,” the employer’s policy must be disseminated and provide 
alternative reporting channels. Plaintiffs, however, do not always challenge the 
sufficiency of  the policy, opting instead to challenge the correction portion of  
the reasonable employer prong or only the unreasonable employee prong. If  
the plaintiff does not challenge the policy, the court is less likely to describe the 
policy in sufficient detail. Moreover, plaintiff’s decision not to challenge the 
policy increases the likelihood that it is a good policy given the low incre-
mental cost of  challenging the policy weighed against the possible downsides 
associated with challenging it—if  a plaintiff attempts to challenge a good 
policy, they might lose credibility with the fact finder, or inadvertently shine a 
spotlight on the employer’s apparent diligence to prevent harassment. 
Exhibit 3
Employer efforts to prevent harassment
Preventive Measure Percentage
Had a policy 84%
Disseminated the policy 73%
Policy provided alternative channels of 
redress
54%
Court considered it a “good” policy 53%
Employer made other efforts 37%
Employer trained employees 31%
Toll-free report line provided 19%
Policy described the penalty 13%
Policy promised investigation of 
complaints
26%
Had anti-retaliation policy 15%
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Courts found that employers responded appropriately to 
harassment in 69 percent of  cases, but fired alleged harassers 
in just 21 percent of  cases. Alleged harassers were disciplined 
in some other way (short of  termination) in 23 percent of  cases. 
The harasser or the plaintiff was transferred in 15 percent of  
cases—the harasser half  of  the time and the employee the 
other half. In 14 percent of  cases, the employer investigated the 
complaint but took no further action, and did nothing at all in 
21 percent of  cases. 
With regard to employees, courts determined that the 
employee reported to the correct person in 81 percent of  cases, 
and was timely in 59 percent of  cases. In 7 percent of  cases, 
the employee’s claim suffered from some other defect, such as 
vagueness, and in 5 percent of  cases, the employee rejected the 
corrective action the employer offered.
Empirical Strategy
Using logistic regression, we modeled employer success on each 
prong of  the affirmative defense, and on the defense overall, as 
a function of  eight independent variables. In all three analyses, 
the dependent variable is dichotomous (taking the value 1 if  an 
employer satisfied the prong, 0 if  not).60 
Two complications emerged: slight multicollinearity and 
quasi-complete separation. Multicollinearity exists with respect 
to two independent variables in the reasonable employer model, 
namely, whether the employer responded adequately to a 
complaint and whether there was some defect in the employer’s 
general conduct. Therefore, we modeled the reasonable em-
ployer prong twice, first omitting the “defect” variable and then 
omitting the “good response” variable. 
Because of  separation, we had to modify the treatment 
of  the timeliness variable with regard to the unreasonable em-
ployee prong. Separation occurs when the dependent variable 
60 In some cases, courts address one prong, but not the other. As a result, 
the model for the reasonable employer prong has a different set of  observa-
tions than the models for the unreasonable employee prong and the overall 
defense. This explains how multicollinearity can exist in one model but not in 
other models that use the same independent variables.
Independent Variable
Prong 1  





Good Policy –0.62 0.08 0.37 –0.35
Other Efforts –0.01 –0.68 –1.58 –0.90
Good Response 4.28*** — 2.67* 2.69*
Employer Defect — –4.04*** –2.30 –2.77
Employee Behavior
Employee Reported Harassment –2.45** –1.93 –4.15*** –4.24***
Report was Timely –3.22** –4.01** –5.70*** –6.05***
Report was Otherwise Defective 2.64** 1.32 4.11** 4.14**
Employee Rejected the Redress Offered 3.60* 3.90* 5.34* 6.55***
Constant 3.75** 7.08*** 7.42*** 7.90***
Wald Chi-squared 26.16*** 26.07*** 15.64** 14.67*
PRE 81% 85% 87% 87%
N 127 127 123 131
 Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Prong 1 is run twice, first omitting the "defective employer conduct" variable (Column A), and then omitting 
the "good employer response variable" (Column B). Prong 2 is subject to separation, and thus we applied Firth’s penalized-likelihood approach, 
which modifies the way in which the coefficients for the unreasonable employee variable are estimated.
Exhibit 4
Model of outcomes of Ellerth/Faragher defenses
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has the same value for all observations in which an independent 
variable takes on a given value, and this occurred whenever 
plaintiffs’ reports of  harassment were deemed untimely. In those 
cases, the defendant always satisfied the unreasonable employee 
prong. Rather than take the step of  excluding the problem-
atic variable, we needed to keep it because it is an important 
determinant of  whether the unreasonable employee prong is 
met.61 Instead we used what is called Firth’s penalized-likelihood 
approach, which modifies the way in which the coefficients for 
the variable in question are estimated.62 
Two Prongs, Two Outcomes
The Reasonable Employer Prong
The model of  the reasonable employer prong points to the 
importance of  employers’ corrective actions once there’s been a 
complaint (Good Response and Employer Defect were signifi-
cant in predicting success; see Exhibit 4). Courts take preventive 
efforts into account as a matter of  course (that is, Good Policy 
and Other Efforts were nonsignificant because they either exist 
or don’t). In contrast, the “correction” inquiry involves different 
forms of  proof  relating to the harassment investigation and any 
disciplinary action taken against the harasser. Moreover, the 
correction inquiry involves far more for a plaintiff to materially 
dispute. Similarly, there are more opportunities for a judge to 
decide that the “reasonableness” question is better left to the 
jury than declared as a matter of  law. 
Reasonableness also enters into consideration of  the 
employee-behavior variables, which were significant in both 
models for predicting employers’ success at proving the reason-
able employer prong. Once again, the form of  evidence relevant 
on summary judgment brings the correction portion of  the 
reasonable employer prong into focus. But the reasonableness 
of  the employer’s corrective efforts depends in large part on the 
employee’s behavior. For example, if  an employee’s report of  
harassment is vague or the employee refuses to participate in 
the internal investigation, it can impede the employer’s ability 
to determine whether the alleged harassment occurred. Courts 
assessing the reasonableness of  employers in these cases may 
be more forgiving. To summarize, the outcomes regarding the 
reasonable employer prong are entirely unremarkable. We 
61 Christopher Zorn, A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models, 
13 Pol. Analysis 157, 161 (2005).
62 For example, see: Georg Heinze & Michael Schemper, A Solution 
to the Problem of  Separation in Logistic Regression, 21 Stats. Med. 2409, 2410-11 
(2002); Christopher Zorn, supra, at 162 (“Firth’s method prevents researchers 
from being forced either to omit manifestly important covariates from their 
models or to engage in post hoc data manipulation in order to obtain parameter 
estimates for those covariates.”). See also: David Firth, Bias Reduction of  Maxi-
mum Likelihood Estimates, Biometrika 80:1, at 27-38 (1993).  These authorities 
note that other alternatives are inferior, such as using exact logistic regression, 
manipulating the data, or using an arbitrary standard value as the estimate for 
the problematic variable’s coefficient. Heinze & Schemper, supra; Zorn, supra 
at 162
expected as much, because the standard for this prong—that 
the employer exercised reasonable efforts to prevent and correct 
harassment—is uncontroversial. Accordingly, judges have no 
reason to be duplicitous in the name of  achieving justice or 
incentivizing behavior. This is in line with our thesis that judges 
depart from rationality only when there is sufficient justifica-
tion for doing so. As we explain next, the departure occurs with 
regard to the unreasonable employee prong.
The Unreasonable Employee Prong
To satisfy the unreasonable employee prong of  the defense, 
employers must show that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of  preventive or corrective opportunities the 
employer provided. The most straightforward hypothesis was 
borne out: all employee-behavior variables were highly signifi-
cant. Courts assessing the reasonableness of  employees pay close 
attention to employee behavior. 
However, it seems clear that the courts are also taking into 
account the employer’s response to the report of  harassment, 
even though that response necessarily occurs after the employee 
has made a report. Our studies have found that employer behav-
ior is a significant predictor of  the determination of  the employ-
ee’s reasonableness.63 This finding suggests that the courts are 
engaging in mental gymnastics to avoid penalizing well-behaved 
employers. The result we have observed suggests that, when 
confronted with an employer who corrects well, courts scrutinize 
the employee’s conduct to find it unreasonable. 
Courts appear to employ the timeliness of  the employee’s 
complaint as evidence of  unreasonableness. In many cases, the 
only employee defect the court is able to highlight is a period of  
delay in reporting harassment. These “unreasonable” peri-
ods can be surprisingly brief. For example, the Tenth Circuit, 
in Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building Services Corp., held a 
seventeen-day delay unreasonable as a matter of  law.64 Note that 
the employer had a sterling anti-harassment policy, promptly 
investigated the complaint, and fired the harasser. On the other 
hand, courts have rejected far longer periods of  delay as a basis 
for finding the employee unreasonable, often when the employ-
er’s response to the report of  harassment was less than ideal. For 
example, in Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc., the court in the Western 
District of  Pennsylvania held that a plaintiff’s four-month delay 
was not unreasonable as a matter of  law.65 In this instance, the 
employer was slow to investigate and ultimately offered nothing 
more than to transfer the employee. Similarly, in Walker v. United 
Parcel Service of  America, Inc., the employee endured sexual harass-
ment for seven years before complaining to a supervisor, and 
63 Sherwyn et al., supra at 1287 tbl.3B (finding significant variables relat-
ing to whether the employer had a good harassment policy and whether the 
employer’s response to the report of  harassment was sufficient).
64 95 F. App’x 276, 281 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
65 174 F. App’x 18, 26 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
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penalized-likelihood analysis. (Model A exhibited no such 
separation.) 
As hypothesized, both the employer’s response and, alterna-
tively, whether there was another defect in the employer’s behav-
ior are significant predictors of  the likelihood a court will find an 
employee’s complaint timely, even when controlling for the length 
of  the delay and the employee’s other behavior. Admittedly, be-
cause observational studies say nothing of  causation, this empiri-
cal outcome could have either of  two explanations: either it is 
the product of  results-oriented adjudication, or some real-world 
correlation exists between employee timeliness and employer 
behavior. The latter explanation is unsatisfying because Good 
Response has a negative coefficient and Employer Defect has 
a positive coefficient.68 In other words, that explanation would 
suggest that employees may delay longer when employers are 
better at correcting harassment, contrary to the intuitive narra-
tive that an employer worse at responding to harassment gives 
employees more of  a reason to delay reporting. 
Instead, the likely explanation for our findings is results-
oriented adjudication. Our analysis provides compelling 
empirical evidence that courts seize on any delay in reporting 
harassment as a justification for holding well-behaved employers 
harmless. This indicates that, in deciding whether a complaint 
was timely, courts tended to weigh the employer’s response 
more heavily than how long a plaintiff waited. The problem, 
of  course, is that this conclusion violates the clear language of  
the Ellerth/Faragher defense. That is, if  the employee behaves 
reasonably, the unreasonable employee defense should be 
unavailable. Such is not the case, as we explain below.
Full Defense
All employee-behavior variables and one employer-behavior 
variable were significant in predicting success of  the defense 
overall. To prevail on the affirmative defense, the employer 
must satisfy both prongs. Thus, the reasonable expectation is 
that significant factors in the individual-prong models remain 
significant in the model of  the overall defense. This hypothesis 
was borne out except with respect to the variable representing 
whether there was a defect in the employer’s general behavior. 
Thus, it is likely that, as compared with the employee’s behavior 
and the employer’s response to that behavior, other defects in 
the employer’s behavior are simply not important (or the effect 
is too small to detect with our sample size). Those results do 
not undermine the central thesis of  this article, namely, that 
courts consider employer behavior in assessing the unreasonable 
employee prong. This explanation is especially convincing given 
our results, summarized in Exhibit 5, showing that employer 
response is significant to courts’ findings regarding the timeliness 
of  employee complaints.
68 Employer’s good response is negatively correlated with Employer Defect 
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 Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Model A is a logit analysis of 
timeliness as a function of an employer's "good" response; Model B 
applies Firth’s penalized-likelihood approach to model the "timely" 
variable in relation to whether the employer's conduct was somehow 
defective.
Exhibit 5
Model outcomes for "timely"
then the employer took no action. 66 As part of  its decision, the 
Tenth Circuit court found that the employer failed to satisfy the 
unreasonable employee prong, despite a seven-year reporting 
delay.67
To further examine the effect of  employer behavior in 
courts’ assessment of  employee timeliness, we modeled the time-
liness determination as a function of  employer corrective action. 
In Model A, we modeled timeliness as a function of  whether the 
employer had a “good” response and, in Model B, we modeled 
whether the employer’s conduct was otherwise defective, with 
the results shown in Exhibit 5. In both models we controlled for 
the length of  the delay, as well as employer preventive behavior 
and employee behavior. It is reasonable to expect that the de-
termination of  the timeliness of  a complaint will vary with the 
length of  the delay, but we also included whether the employee 
complained and whether there was some other defect in the 
employee’s behavior, such as vagueness, even though those latter 
points should not influence the timeliness of  the complaint. In 
fact, in Model B, the “defect” variable exhibited quasi-complete 
separation with the dependent variable, so we applied Firth’s 
66 76 F. App’x 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2003). 
67 Id. at 888. 
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Focus on Employer Actions 
The outcome of  Davis v. Team Electric Co. helps clarify the point 
regarding the importance of  employer behavior. 69 In the cases 
we studied here, the employer prevailed in all but one case 
where the employee failed to report. In that case, Davis, the 
employee failed to report but still prevailed. The employer was 
woefully deficient in its efforts to prevent or correct harassment 
and the conclusion that the employee “failed to complain” was 
questionable at best. The court noted that there was no evi-
dence that the employer had an anti-harassment policy, nor did 
the employer perform an investigation or take action against the 
harassing supervisors. The court concluded that the “employee 
failed to complain” because she only complained to the harass-
ing supervisors.70 This case indicates that an employer’s behavior 
can be so bad that an employee’s “failure” to complain is not 
regarded as an unreasonable failure if  no such opportunities are 
available. However, this case is an outlier because the employer 
was so deficient. In the other 24 non-report cases that we 
studied, an employer who exercises reasonable care to prevent 
harassment will always prevail if  the employee fails to report 
alleged harassment. 71
More commonly, the employee’s actions do have a bearing 
on the case outcome. The employer prevailed in 90 of  the 106 
cases in which employees did report. However, courts sometimes 
held that an employee was unreasonable for declining an em-
ployer’s proposed remedy, even when it disadvanged the employ-
ee (such as the offer of  a transfer). We found seven cases where 
employees failed to avoid harm by rejecting their employer’s 
accommodations. For example, in Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of  
America, Inc., once the employee complained of  harassment, the 
employer investigated the allegations and offered to transfer her 
to another store away from the allegedly offending supervisor.72 
Because the employee refused this offer and resigned instead, 
the court found that the employee was unreasonable.73 Similarly, 
in Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of  Alabama, the plaintiff re-
signed when, after complaining about harassment, her employer 
offered to keep her in the same position but provide counseling 
between her and the alleged harasser.74 The court held that 
refusing this “first step” in conflict resolution was unreasonable. 
Similarly, courts found resigning or refusing to return to work 
after employers disciplined or fired harassers unreasonable.75 
69 520 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2008).
70 We coded this as failing to complain.
71 Sherwyn et al., supra.
72 507 F.3d 1139, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 2007).
73 Id. See also: Harmon v. Home Depot USA Inc., 130 F. App’x 902, 905 
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding a plaintiff unreasonable where she quit when the 
employer was attempting to work out a transfer); Wallace v. San Joaquin Cnty., 58 
F. App’x 289, 291 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a plaintiff unreasonable where she 
refused to cooperate in the investigation and refused to pursue a transfer).
74 480 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 2007).
75 Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc., 126 F. App’x 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App’x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004).
In one case, the employee was found unreasonable when she 
reported the harassment to a supervisor but specifically asked 
the supervisor not to commence an investigation for fear of  
reprisal.76 In another nine cases, employee’s reporting suffered 
some defect (e.g., the complaint was vague).77 
Judicial Rule-Breaking Explained
The question before us is, why is there judicial rule breaking in 
the Ellerth/Faragher context but not with regard to Oncale? This 
is a matter of  considerable interest, because we found 56 cases 
in which employers prevailed even though employees reported 
alleged harassment to the correct persons, did not reject their 
employers’ accommodations, and suffered from no other defect 
limiting their claims. In each case the court held that the report 
was untimely, but none of  the employees in these cases reported 
the alleged misconduct in what one might consider an untimely 
way. Instead, in each of  these cases the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment, and the 
court simply would not rule against an employer apparently 
doing what it could to prevent or correct harassment. As shown 
in Exhibit 4, courts looked to employer behavior to determine 
whether the employee’s behavior was reasonable, and as shown 
more specifically in Exhibit 5, the court looked to employer 
behavior in determining whether the reports were timely. 
Courts’ reliance on reporting timeliness has effectively evis-
cerated the unreasonable employee prong for cases of  pervasive 
harassment. One justification that courts cite for finding a delay 
unreasonable is that the victim could have prevented future 
instances of  harassment with an earlier report. Courts have 
described this as a duty to stop harassment before it becomes 
“severe or pervasive.”78 But by placing this obligation on the 
victim, courts effectively eliminate the unreasonable employee 
prong of  the defense (at least with respect to harassment alleged 
to be pervasive, versus severe). 79
76 See: Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 
2005). Note that Viacom Television Stations, Inc., and Viacom Broadcasting 
of  Seattle, Inc., were also named in the dismissed action.
77 For example, see: Episcopo v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F. App’x 519, 523 
(7th Cir. 2005); Hardage, supra; and Benefield v. Fulton Co., GA, 130 F. App’x 308, 
312 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 
F.3d 961, 971 (11th Cir. 2008).
78 For example, see: Ellerth, supra (“To the extent limiting employer 
liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it be-
comes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”); 
and Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of  Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 
2007) (“The genius of  the Faragher-Ellerth plan is that the corresponding duties 
it places on employers and employees are designed to stop sexual harassment 
before it reaches the severe or pervasive stage amounting to discrimination in 
violation of  Title VII.”)
79 Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of  Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 
2009) (“Had [defendant] been notified earlier, there is a good chance that 
Title VII’s primary goal of  preventing harm would have been served.”); and 
Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“Had [plaintiff] notified [defendant’s] officials in June, when the harass-
ment initially began, most of  the incidents complained of  could have been 
avoided.”).
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Depending on how long an employee waits to report ongo-
ing harassment, it appears that an employee’s good behavior can 
never subject an employer to liability, contrary to what the letter 
of  the affirmative defense mandates. All that seems to matter 
in pervasive harassment cases is the employer’s behavior. We 
anticipate that employees whose employers acted reasonably will 
themselves be found to be unreasonable due to a lack of  timeli-
ness or due to reporting too soon, rendering the harassment not 
yet pervasive.
This result probably stems from the courts’ percepetion of  
the unfairness of  the conjunctive nature of  the two-pronged 
affirmative defense. If  an employer acts reasonably to prevent 
and correct harassment, it may seem unfair to extend vicarious 
liability to that employer just because the employer was unlucky 
enough that the employee complained. Moreover, our findings 
lend continued support to the argument that the affirmative 
defense perversely incentivizes employers not to make it too easy 
for employees to complain, lest they foreclose the possibility of  
satisfying the unreasonable employee prong. Rather than incen-
tivizing employers to do all they can to prevent harassment, the 
rule incentivizes only the bare minimum of  preventive efforts, 
and nothing more.
The majority of  courts seem to have solved this problem by 
making new law. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s apparent 
intentions, employers that exercise reasonable care to prevent 
harassment and react well to a complaint will almost always pre-
vail at summary judgment. To justify this, courts must declare 
the plaintiff untimely, and therefore unreasonable, regardless of  
whether the delay, if  any, was reasonable and regardless of  how 
much time actually elapsed before the report. 
We found only one case (out of  72), Moore v. Sam’s Club, 
where a court denied summary judgment to an employer who 
(according to the court) exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct harassment when the employee complained.80 Instead 
the Moore court (in the District of  New York) applied the rule 
technically and allowed the employee’s complaint to go forward. 
This case was heard in 1999, and we have seen nothing of  the 
kind since that time. Thus, in the 213 cases we studied in this 
context, there was only one case where the courts applied the 
rule so that it yielded a result that all other cases avoided. A 
“good actor” employer who acted reasonably to prevent and 
correct harassment was found guilty because the employee com-
plained. In every other case, such “good actor” employers were 
rewarded regardless of  whether the employee reported or not.
Why Judges Ignore Ellerth/Faragher but Follow Oncale
Our theory about why judges follow Oncale but disregard Ellerth 
and Faragher is that they perceive the Oncale rule to affect a 
fairly narrow population of  litigants, but the broadly applicable 
Ellerth/Faragher rule warrants greater judicial initiative to prevent 
injustice. We also must point out that it is unlikely that either 
80 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (1999).
the Supreme Court or Congress will address these rules any 
time soon (absent a prominent split in the circuits, which does 
not now exist). In particular, the Court will not make a change 
because it so recently created the rules. Moreover, the Court left 
these rules largely untouched when it decided Pennsylvania State 
Police v. Suders in 200481 and Vance in 2013. We should also point 
out that in the three cases we have been discussing the Court 
expressly created rules for future cases. Oncale did not just hold 
that there was a cause of  action for same-sex harassment, it 
set forth the rule on how to prove sexual harassment. Similarly, 
Ellerth and Faragher created a new affirmative defense that was 
not part of  the case. This was a true act of  judicial fiat. As 
for Congress, it has yet to codify sexual harassment, even as it 
made several adjustments to the civil rights laws in 1991. Thus, 
expecting no rescue from the Court or Congress, judges will 
determine whether to observe the rules by considering the 
frequency of  cases and the relative harm to litigants and society 
caused by strict application of  the rules. 
With regard to Oncale’s equal-opportunity harasser defense, 
the frequency multiplied by the harm is not worth the costs 
judges incur by ignoring or misapplying the rule. Only 73 fed-
eral court opinions since Oncale use the phrase “equal opportu-
nity harasser” (or some derivative thereof), demonstrating the 
small number of  cases in which this defense comes up. 82 Even 
if  a would-be harasser knew of  this defense, there is always a 
risk that it may not work. Moreover, while the consequences to 
the plaintiffs affected by the defense are harsh—they lose their 
case—it will not really affect society as a whole.
In contrast, cases involving the two-prong Ellerth/Faragher 
test are commonplace. We found 72 summary judgment mo-
tions filed on the rule in its first 18 months alone.83 A Thomson 
Reuters Westlaw search using the terms “sexual harassment,” 
Ellerth, and “affirmative defense” (or derivatives thereof) yielded 
2,360 cases.84 Every circuit has analyzed the defense.
There’s more to this matter, however. In stark contrast 
to Oncale, if  courts dutifully follow the Ellerth/Faraher rule, this 
81 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (holding that to establish a “constructive 
discharge,” an employee must show that the abusive working environment 
became so intolerable that any reasonable person would quit, but that the El-
lerth/Faragher defense would be available unless the employee quits in response 
to an adverse action changing her employment status or situation, such as a 
demotion).
82 We searched for the phrase “equal-opportunity-harass!” across the 
“All Federal” case database on what was then known as WestlawNext, limiting 
the results to cases decided after March 4, 2008. We ran this search most re-
cently on May 25, 2014, and received 73 hits. This result is likely underinclu-
sive because a court need not use the phrase “equal opportunity harasser” to 
describe the defense, but the result is also overinclusive because some number 
of  the 73 cases were false hits. Nevertheless, this is still useful as a rough indi-
cation of  how rare these cases are. 
83 Sherwyn et al., supra.
84 On May 26, 2014, we ran a search in the “All Federal” case database 
on WestlawNext using the following syntax: ((sex! gender) /1 haras!) & (ellerth 
faragher “118 s.ct. 2257” “524 u.s. 742” “118 s.ct. 2275” “524 u.s. 775”) & 
affirmative-defense.  
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carries a high probability of  disastrous results for a large target 
pool. If  employees prevail whenever they complain, the message 
to employers will be: exercise at least some reasonable care to prevent 
harassment, but not too much. In practical terms, rigid application 
of  the two-prong test disincentivizes employers from doing 
anything more than the baseline that courts routinely find 
constitutes “reasonable efforts” to prevent harassment, which 
means establishing a strong, written anti-harassment policy with 
more than one avenue to report harassment.85 As a corollary, 
we see little reason under the law for any employer to continue 
to provide harassment identification training, toll-free harass-
ment reporting hotlines, or other mechanisms that increase the 
likelihood that harassment will be properly identified and timely 
reported. 
Employees who complain of  harassment that violates 
the law will prevail. Thus, employers investigating complaints 
of  harassment have countervailing incentives: acknowledging 
that harassment occurred amounts to a party admission as to 
whether harassment occurred, but at the same time, performing 
an investigation in bad faith poses a risk to the employer’s ability 
to establish the reasonable employer prong.
As a practical matter, there’s a logic behind judges’ follow-
ing the Oncale rule and ignoring Ellerth/Faragher. This analysis 
presents a cautionary tale for judges faced with the opportunity 
to make rules. Judges ought to consider the degree to which 
rules will create the problem described in this article for lower 
court judges charged with their application. All else equal, judg-
es should weigh the probability of  contemplated harm caused 
by application of  the rule times the affected pool of  individuals 
or entities to which the rule’s potential harm would extend. If  
the probability times the affected pool of  individuals or entities 
is large, judges may be better advised to advance a standard, 
allowing augmented judicial discretion.86 All else equal, rules 
are more likely to be applied when the target population of  the 
rule’s application is small, and the probability of  the harm is 
relatively low. While it may be tempting to embrace rules over 
standards because of  predictability, such predictability is an illu-
sion in the case of  the Ellerth/Faragher defense given the extent to 
which judges distort the application of  the rule.
Testing the Theory
Our theory will be tested over the next few years in the wake of  
the Supreme Court’s Vance decision. Like the affirmative defense 
and the equal-opportunity harasser cases, the “tangible action” 
rule set forth in Vance yields an untenable result if  applied prop-
erly.87 The essence of  the Vance holding is that only people with 
85 For example, see: Wright v. Anixter, Inc., 188 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(decision); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001); Thompson 
v. Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App’x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004); and Gorzynski v. JetBlue 
Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2010). 
86 Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory 
of  Rules and Standards, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 23-26.
87 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
actual power over working conditions (such as pay and promo-
tion) can be considered as agents of  a company with regard 
to sexual harassment. In this light, the employee who oversees 
day-to-day operations, has the power to assign work, has the 
power to make employees’ working conditions pleasant or 
miserable, and can effectively recommend terminations will no 
longer be considered a “supervisor,” because decisions regarding 
“tangible” employment changes ultimately rest with the human 
resources department. To counteract this unjust result, lower 
courts could expand the term “tangible action” to render Vance 
meaningless. In a vacuum, courts would likely engage in such 
holdings because Vance is out of  touch with the way American 
businesses operate, and because this case affects every sexual 
harassment allegation, given that every sexual harassment case 
rests on whether the harasser was a supervisor and, further, be-
cause limiting that definition undermines the law.88 Thus, courts 
should change the law. 
We predict, however, that courts will not expand the defini-
tion of  tangible loss to essentially overturn Vance, because apply-
ing Vance, as decided, allows the courts to continue to do what 
our study reveals they have already done. They have effectively 
rewritten Ellerth and Faragher into a de facto negligence standard. 
As it stands now, employees who do not suffer a tangible loss will 
recover only if  the employer did not exercise reasonable care to 
prevent harassment or if  the employer did not respond well to 
a reported complaint. Vance allows courts to follow this de facto 
“negligence” standard in all non-tangible loss cases by making 
supervisors into coworkers—and we predict that the courts will 
do so. Thus, instead of  finding ways to make employees unrea-
sonable, courts will deem all but the most obvious supervisors to 
be coworkers in order to perpetuate the de facto vicarious liability 
standard created by a host of  lower-court decisions.
Analyzing judicial rule breaking behavior in common civil 
cases like those discussed in this article contributes to our under-
standing of  judicial behavior more broadly because we are able 
to study behavior in a context stripped of  the normative and 
political settings in which rule breaking is more often described 
and studied. Absent the strong political or social forces that 
might influence a judge to conform her behavior to expecta-
tions when she feels that she is being closely watched, this article 
begins to shed light on rule breaking by judges. 
In closing, this article presents findings about a single area 
of  law and one set of  rules. We suggest that additional research 
is surely necessary to compare judges’ behavior in other areas of  
law with regard to other untenable rules, but we believe that this 
article lays a solid foundation to advance our understanding of  
rule breaking under quotidian adjudicative circumstances. n
88 Id., at 2439. The Court said: “If  the harassing employee is the 
victim’s coworker, the employer is liable only if  it was negligent in controlling 
working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a ‘supervisor,’ however, 
different rules apply. If  the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible 
employment action, the employer is strictly liable.”
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